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THE FRENCH "HEADSCARVES BAN":
INTOLERANCE OR NECESSITY?
REUVEN (Ruvi) ZIEGLER*

I.

PROLOGUE

The interplay between state and religion stands at the core of
the public discourse in many Western democracies. One of the
important institutions where this interplay faces a daily legal and
practical challenge is in public schools,' where the future
generation's character is highly influenced, values and culture are
taught and absorbed, and long-term personal relations with
colleagues begin their journey.
In the past few years, ethnic tension in French public schools
has risen, following the National Assembly's decision to adopt
legislation prohibiting the wearing of "ostentatious religious
symbols" by students, which went into effect on September 1,
2004.2 The aim of this article is to examine the French legislation
in a broader context. The article contends that in Western liberal
democracies, fundamental social and legal norms influence the
interpretation and the protection granted to human rights in
general, and to the right to freedom of religion and culture in
particular.
However, the article does not intend to advocate a certain
position regarding the French legislation's constitutionality, but
rather, endeavors to question the justifications, as well as the legal
and social background of the legislation. As a result, the analysis
LL.M. magna cum laude, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Israel, 2005.
LL.B. cum laude, B.A. (Economics), University of Haifa, Israel, 2001. I wish to
thank Chaim Gans, Sylviane Colombo, Guy E. Carmi, Shai Otzri, Zvi Ziegler
and the editorial board of The John Marshal Law Review for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. All errors and omissions remain
mine alone.
1. In Europe, most students study at state-funded, public schools; private
schools are quite rare, and usually have a religious affiliation. See generally,
J. Dronkers, More Parental Choice in Europe? Overview of Effectiveness
Differences between Religious Schools and Public Schools in Several European
Societies (Apr. 14, 2001) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Educational Research Association), available at http://eric.ed.gov/

ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/contenLstorage_010000000b800d/92/ac.pdf.
2. Law of March 4, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Republique Franqaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 18, 2004, at 9033.
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will not only deal with the particular rights at stake, but also with
the way liberal democracies deal with the wearing of ostentatious
religious, yet also cultural, symbols in the public sphere. It
appears from the analysis that a state's chosen course of action is
primarily determined by the legal model of the interplay between
state and religion it has chosen to follow, and by the relations in
society between the majority and minority groups.
The first part of the article examines the French system
generally as far as the relations between state and religion are
concerned. It examines the legislation through the prism of human
rights law, particularly the right to freedom of religion and
conscience, the right to culture, the right to equality and the right
to education. Following is an examination of common models of
the interplay between state and religion prevalent throughout the
Western world, namely the secular-state model, the separation
between church and state model, and the state official religion
model. Lastly, the article takes a closer look at the underlying
themes of French society: the concepts of secularity, neutrality and
the "melting pot."
The question of state intervention (or guidance rather) in the
way the future generation is educated has long been debated.
Through this prism, it appears that the dilemma concerning
whether the state has a right to cast away from the public sphere
"non-state actors" religions, minority cultures, or other
supposedly "divisive" factors - has never been starker. I hope this
article will shed some light on, and offer a critique of, the
rationales that led France to adopt, by an overwhelming majority,
an act that allows the state to limit basic human rights.
II. THE FIFTH REPUBLIC:
MILLENNIUM -

FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE THIRD
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AND THEIR

IMPLEMENTATION IN FRENCH PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A.

The Interplay between Church and State in France

The roots of the right to freedom of religion and conscience in
France can be traced back to the 1789 Revolution and the
Declaration of the Rights of Citizen and Man. Article 10 of the
Declaration states:
No one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious
ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere
with the established Law and Order.3
3. Pr~sidence de la Rkpublique, The Declarationof Human Rights (1789),
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/anglais/theinstitutions/founding-texts/thedeclara
tion-ofthe-humanjrights/the-declaration-of thehuman rights.20240.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2007) (discussing the history of The Declaration of

Human Rights in France. The declaration was approved by the French
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France is a self-declared secular state, dating back to the Law on
Secularity (lai lo sur la lacit6) of 1905. 4 The law was promulgated
as a consequence of the Dreyfus affair,' which undermined the
stability of the Third Republic, and highlighted the discord
between the religious bodies and the secular elites.
Section 1 of the Law on Secularity reiterates the right to
freedom of religion and conscience.' On the other hand, section 2
focuses on the principle of secularity, including the prohibition on
the state recognizing a religion and aiding it financially.! Thus,
alongside the recognition of freedom of religion and conscience in
France, protection is granted to the freedom from religion.8
Further reiterating the fact that France is a secular state by its
definition, Article 1 of the Fifth Republic's constitution prohibits
discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, or religion, and
establishes the duty to respect all religious beliefs.'
National Assembly on Aug. 26, 1789); cf Michel Troper, French Secularism, or
Laicite, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2000) (discussing the distinctiveness
of French secularism).
4. Law Concerning the Separation of Church and State of December 9,
1905, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.l[Official Gazette of
France], December 11, 1905 [hereinafter Law on Secularity].
5. The Dreyfus Affair was a political controversy that divided France
during the 1890s and early 1900s involving the wrongful conviction of Jewish
military officer Alfred Dreyfus for treason, and a subsequent political and
judicial scandal. Fredericz Painton, A Century Late, The Truth Arrives: The
French Army Concedes That Alfred Dreyfus Was Innocent, TIME, Sept. 25,
1995, at 48.
6. "La Republique assure la liberte de conscience. Elle garantit le libre
exercice des cultes sous les seules restrictions e dictees ci-apres dans l'interet
de l'ordre public." Law on Secularity, § 1. As translated by the author, the
section reads: "The republic ensures freedom of conscience. It guarantees the
free exercise of religion subject to the sole restrictions established in the
interest of public policy."
7. "La Republique ne reconnait, nesalarienine subventionne ancun culte.
Enconsequence, seront supprimees des budgets de l'Etat, des departaments et
des communes, toutes dispenses relatives a l'exercice des cultes .... Les
etablissements publics du culte sont supprimes, sous reserve des dispositions
enoncees a l'article 3." Law on Secularity, § 2. As translated by the author,
the section reads: "The republic does not recognize, remunerate, or subsidize
any religion. In consequence.., all expenses concerning the practice of
religions shall be abolished from the budgets of the State, departments, and
townships ...The publicly formed or financed establishments of religion are
abolished subject to the conditions stipulated in Article 3." Cf. Hannah
Clayson-Smith, Liberte, Egalite, et Fraternite at Risk for New Religious
Movements in France, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1116-17 (2000) (discussing the
"chilling effect" on religion as a result of France's anti-sect policy).
8. See Niyazi Oktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 386
(2002) (discussing similar principles to the French principles of religious
freedom specified in the Turkish Constitution).
9. Article 1 reads: "France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and
social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law,
without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs." 1958
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A secular state model, similar to the French model, exists in
only four other democracies: Turkey, India, Mexico, and Japan. 10
The French consider religion to be a private matter, not to be
expressed in public." The basic premise is that the protection
granted to other rights is better served when the state retains its
secular identity."
France further cements its secular character in the state's
assumption of the duty to provide universal education. Since
1882, the state has been entrusted with the role of providing free
public education for all.13 The preamble of the French Constitution
of 1958 affirms the right to free and secular education by invoking
the preamble to the Constitution of 1946: "The Nation guarantees
equal access for children and adults to instruction, vocational
training and culture. The provision of free, public and secular
education at all levels is a duty of the State."14 France, therefore,
is indeed a self-declared secular state, which protects the right to
freedom of religion and conscience as long as exercising it does not
undermine it's the state's secular character. 5
B. The "HeadscarvesBan" in Historic Context

For various reasons, discussed below, the ongoing wearing of
"ostentatious religious symbols" in public schools by Christians
and Jews had not initially caused public controversy. 6 The
controversy began with a decision made on September 18, 1989, by
a secondary school headmaster in Creil, a northern suburb of
Paris, to expel from school three veiled female Muslim students of
North African descent. 17
The headmaster's decision was
overturned within a week, but the Education Minister, Lionel
Jospin, approached the Conseil d'Etat requesting a legal advisory

CONST art. 1, available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp
(last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
10. Cynthia Baines, L'Affaire des Foulards-Discrimination,or the Price of a
SecularEducationSystem?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 311 n.50 (1996).
11. Elisa T. Belier, The HeadscarvesAffair: The Conseil d'Etat on the Role
of Religion and Culture in French Society, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 581, 591-92
(2004).
12. See Troper, supra note 3, at 1272-73 (analyzing the history of the
relations between church and state in France).
13. Law of March 28, 1882, available at http://www.assembleenationale.fr/histoire/loiferry/sommaire.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
14. 1946 CONST. Preamble.
15. Troper, supra note 3, at 1276 (noting the foundations laid by the law on

secularity).
16. Baines, supra note 10, 305 (describing the types of religious symbols
considered to be controversial in France).
17. Id. at 304 (introducing the event which ignited the hijab controversy).

In this paper, the terms headscarf, veil, and hijab are used alternately.

20061

The French "HeadscarvesBan"

opinion on the issue.'8 The Conseil d'Etat's opinion reaffirmed
France's secular state status, noting two main principles:
neutrality regarding religion in public services, and the
nondiscriminatory nature of the public school system. 9 According
to the opinion, students in public schools have a right to religious
self-expression as long as exercising it does not hurt their peers'
right to freedom from religion. 0
According to the opinion, the right to freedom of religion and
conscience, is not absolute, and can be limited when there is just
cause, based on the need to maintain French public education's
respect for religious tolerance and gender equality.2 "Thus,
'ostentatious' religious signs" should be banned22 when:
By their character, by the circumstances in which they were worn,
individually or collectively, or by their ostentatious or campaigning
nature, constituted an act of pressure, provocation, proselytism or
propaganda, or which were aimed at the dignity or freedom of other
pupils or members of the school community, or compromised their
health or distributed good order and the peaceful running of the
school.22

The council based its ruling on the claim that the
relevantinternational covenants related to these matters allow
reservations for "the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."24 The
Conseil d'Etat's ruling stands for the proposition that there need
not necessarily be a direct conflict between the principle of

18. Sebastian Poulter, Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal
Approaches in England and France, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES. 43, 58
(1997) (describing the history of the headscarf controversy in France).
19. Beller, supra note 11, at 611 (reaffirming the fact that there are two
main beliefs regarding the role religion ought to play in the French public
schools).
20. Poulter, supra note 18, at 58-9 (discussing the Conseil's opinion
concerning students' rights to religious expression).
21. Beller, supra note 11, at 611 (noting that the freedom of belief is
balanced by the government's need to protect other sects of society).
22. All Over an Inch of Flesh, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2003, Europe, at 45.
23. The French reads:
[Plar leur nature, par les conditions dans lesquelles ils seraient portes
individuellement ou collectivement, ou par leur caractere ostentatoire ou
revendicatif, constitueraient un acte de pression, de provocation, de
proselytisme ou de propaganda, porteraient atteinte a la dignite ou a la
liberte de l'eleve ou d'autre members de la communaute educative,
compromettraient leur sante ou leur securite, perturberaient le
deroulement des activites d'enseignement et le role educatif des
enseignants, enfin troubleraient l'ordre dans l'etablissement ou le
fonctionnement normal du service public.
24. Beller, supra note 11, at 621 (citing Article 9 of the Council of Europe's
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
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secularity and the protection of the freedom of religion and
conscience in France.25
In 1997, following the rise to power of the Socialist Party, the
Education Minister issued a prohibition on wearing ostentatious
religious symbols in public schools. Some argue the prohibition
was deliberately intended to prevent the wearing of headscarves
rather than religious symbols in general.' Two thousand Muslim
girls refused to follow the order; forty-nine of these cases were
taken to the Conseil d'Etat, and forty-one of the decisions were
held in favor of the petitioners.7
The public controversy remained intense, and was re-ignited
when the Stasi Committee, appointed by President Chirac to
examine the "issue of secularity," recommended on December 11,
2003, that the wearing of ostentatious religious symbols, including
skullcaps, headscarves, and crosses in public buildings and public
schools should be prohibited.25 In response, President Chirac,
defining headscarf wearing as "an act of aggression" called for a
ban on wearing the Muslim headscarf among other "'ostentatious'
display[s] of religious faith."' On December 17, 2003, President
Chirac proclaimed that "[tihe Islamic veil, regardless of the name
you give it... ha[s] no place in State schools." ° He concluded:
"Secularity is one of the Republic's great triumphs. It is a crucial
component of social peace and national cohesion. We cannot let it
weaken.""
On February 10, 2004, the bill passed the French lower house
of Parliament by a landslide majority of 494 to 36. On March 3,
2004, the bill was approved by the French Senate 276 to 20, 3' and
was signed into law by President Chirac on March 15, 2004. The
act, which became enforceable on September 1, 2004, =' prohibits

25. Id. at 608.
26. Poulter, supra note 18, at 65.
27. Beller, supra note 11, at 584.
28. Henri Pefia-Ruiz, Laecitd et 4galitd, leviers de l'mancipation,LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Feb. 10, 2004, at 9.
29. The Stanford Daily Staff, Chirac Shouldn't Seek Headscarf Ban,

http://daily.stanford.edu/article/2004/l/16/chiracShouldntSeekHeadscarfBan
(last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
30. President Jacques Chirac, Speech on Respecting the Principle of
Secularism in the Republic (Excerpts) (Dec. 17, 2003), available at
http://www.elysee.fr/elysee.fr/anglais/speech-byjacques-chirac-president-of t
hejrepiblic on-respectingthe-principle-of secularism_inthe-republic-

excerpts.2675.html.
31. Id.
32. CBS News, France Bans Head Scarves in School: Senate Adopts
Controversial Law Forbidding Religious Apparel, http'//www.cbsnews.con/

stories/2004/02/02/world/main597565.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
33. Denis Simonneau, The Ninth Annual Frankel Lecture: Position Letter:
Free Will, Religious Liberty, and the French Prohibition of Religious
Paraphernalia in Public Schools, 42 HOuS. L. REv. 121, 123 (2005).
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the wearing of "ostentatious religious symbols" in elementary,
secondary and high schools funded by the state."4 The French
public expressed strong support for the Act in opinion polls (about
seventy percent in favor). "5 It is noteworthy that almost half the
Muslim population supported the law, and about half of these
Muslim supporters were women."
According to Denis Simonneau, Consul General de France on
the day the ban became enforceable, among the twelve million
French students, "240 girls attempted to come to school with a
headscarf; 170 agreed to take it off and 70 conciliation procedures
were started."37 On October 20, 2004, two junior high school
female students, aged twelve and thirteen were the first to be
expelled under this law for refusing to take off their headscarves.3

III. THE "HEADSCARVES BAN" IN LIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. InternationalHuman Rights Law in a Global Age
International Human Rights Law has been gradually evolving
since the 1960s, with the establishment of multilateral treaties,
the formation of international organizations whose main task is to
supervise the implementation of states' obligations to respect
human rights, and the convening of periodic international
conventions aimed at promoting some of these rights. Most liberal
Western democracies, including France, are signatories to these
treaties, members of these international bodies, and participants
in the various conventions. However, when the time comes to
enforce these treaties in domestic law, either by legislation or by
court decisions, a wide gap divides the various states'
interpretations of their obligations under the treaties. These
differences in interpretation lie at the core of this paper. This
section presents an overview of the protection granted to the right
to freedom of religion and conscience and to the right to culture
under International Human Rights Law, and questions whether
the new French legislation infringes upon these rights.

34. Law of March 4, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Republique Franqaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], May 18, 2004, p. 9033; see also Integrating
Minorities - The War of the Headscarves, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2004,
Special Report, at 1 [hereinafter The War of the Headscarves] (discussing the

public reaction to the proposal to ban "the wearing of the Islamic headscarf
and other 'conspicuous' religious symbols in state schools" in France).
35. The War of the Headscarves,supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Simonneau, supra note 33, at 123.
38. France Expels Students over Hijab, NEWS GLOBAL, http://english.

aljazeera.net/NEWS/archive/archive?Archiveld=7187
2007).

(last visited Jan.

4,
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This section will further aid in determining how different
countries implement the same obligation to protect rights based on
the state-religion relationship model they have chosen to adopt. It
will thereby facilitate the understanding of the rationales behind
the new legislation in France.
It should be noted at the outset that the interrelation between
the right to freedom of religion and the right to equality comes into
play on two counts. The first regards Muslim women's right to be
free from discrimination at the hands of other social groups. The
second arises with regard to the right to gender equality, which
may be indirectly infringed through the wearing of the veil, and
not by the prohibition thereof. The interrelation between the right
to culture and the right to education, based on the beliefs of the
parent and the social context, may be fully understood only after
gaining a proper understanding of this complex interrelation
between freedom of religion and the right to equality.
B. The Right to Freedom of Religion and Conscience in
InternationalLaw
The foundations of the right to freedom of religion and
conscience rest in several fundamental documents of human rights
law. Section 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with other and in public
or private to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.39
Section 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),' and Section 1, article 9(1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provide the same
framework for protecting the freedom of religion and conscience."
Section 1, article 9(2) of the ECHR defines a closed list of cases in
which this right may be limited:
Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection

39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR
217A, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 18 (Dec. 12, 1948).
40. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), 21, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, art. 18(1) (Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("No one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair his freedom to have... a religion or belief of his choice.").
41. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, § 1, art. 9(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
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of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.42
It can be further argued, that the protection of the freedom of
speech under section 1, article 10 of the ECHR' and article 19 of
the ICCPR encompasses a similar protection of the wearing of
religious symbols. Therefore, it appears that the right to freedom
of religion and conscience enjoys wide international recognition
and protection. These conventions allow the exercise of that right
on both a personal and group level, subject only to the closed list of
limitations provided in the conventions.
C.

The Headscarfas a Religious Symbol

Some religious scholars contend that Islamic law requires
that women wear headscarves covering their ears, hair, and neck.45
According to this view, headscarves are required by modesty
restrictions in the Qur'an,' and thus it is plausible that a
significant number of Muslim women may wear the veil based on
47
A claim
their belief that it is a commandment of the Qur'an.
could therefore be made that the prohibition on the wearing of
ostentatious religious symbols in French public schools infringes
Muslim women's right to freedom of religion, because it prohibits
them from following a religious dictate.

42. Id. at § 1, art. 9(2).
43. See id. at § 1, art. 10(1) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers.").
44. See ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 19 ("Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally,
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.").
45. See, e.g., Wikipedia, http'//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hijab#_note-dict
("Detailed scholarly attention has been focused on prescribing female
dress.... Some scholars go so far as to specify exactly which areas of the body
must be covered. In many cases, this is everything save the face and hands
but others require everything save the eyes to be covered.") (last visited Jan. 4,
2007).
46. Often cited as the basis for such restriction, Surrah 33:59 provides: "0
Prophet! Tell thy wives and thy daughters, as well as all [other] believing
women, that they should draw over themselves some of their outer garments
[when in public]: this will be more conducive to their being recognized [as
decent women] and not annoyed." The Holy Qur'an 33:59.
47. See Samiri Ali Gutoc, Me and My hijab: Reflections on the Veil (2003),
available at http://www.whrnet.org/docs/perspective-gutoc-0309.html (presenting the perspective of one woman who chooses to wear the headscarf based
on personal belief).
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A position paper published by Human Rights Watch,4 in the
context of a discussion of Turkish legislation banning headscarves,
argues that women should be free to choose how to follow their
religious dictates and that their right of choice must be protected.49
According to this position paper, wearing a veil does not endanger
the public health, public security, public order or moral values of a
society, and does not infringe other people's rights.'
As noted
above, according to the ECHR, these conditions are the only ones
that allow a government to pose limitations on the right to
freedom of religion.51
The Quebec Human Rights Committee made a similar
determination: "One should presume that hijab-wearers are
expressing their religious convictions and the hijab should only be
banned when it is demonstrated - and not just presumed - that
public order or sexual equality is in danger."52 Contrary to the
above-mentioned view, some religious scholars claim that the
Qur'andoes not explicitly set a veil-wearing rule, but rather refers
to the general need for modesty. Because modesty is a relative
term, these scholars claim that one can interpret it as requiring
the believer to find a suitable way to keep her privacy in order to
prevent harassment from men.' They maintain that using
headscarves as a "litmus test" of a woman's belief is
inappropriate.'
However, it is commonly believed that the determination
whether an action constitutes a religious dictate rests with the
individual. Thus, if a Muslim woman believes that her religion
48. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEMORANDUM TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH'S CONCERNS WITH REGARD TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM
IN HIGHER EDUCATION, AND ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION FOR WOMEN WHO

WEAR THE HEADSCARF (2004), available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/
eca/turkey/2004/headscarf memo.pdf [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
49. See id. at 44, 46 (arguing that the Turkish government should adopt
legislation that recognizes the right to wear headscarves and "allows women to

make their own free choice whether to wear the headscarf or not" and
presenting recommendations concerning the removal of the Turkish headscarf
ban); see also Bahia Tahzib-Lie, InternationalLaw and Religion and Religion
Symposium Article: Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to
Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2000 BYU L. REV. 967, 970 (2000) (arguing that
"women should be free, at any time, to explore other beliefs and to make their
own choices as to religious commitment and membership").
50. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 4.
51. See supra, note 44 and accompanying text.
52. Baines, supra note 10, at 324.
53. See Elene G. Mountis, Cultural Relativity and Universalism:
Reevaluating Gender Rights in a Multicultural Context, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L.
113, 143 (1996) (explaining that veils warn by Muslim women are intended to
shield them from male advances as well as to keep maintain their modesty).
54. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 40 (reporting the view of
Professor Beyaz, dean of the Theology Faculty of Marmara University in
Istanbul, that the Qur'an does not require women to wear a veil).
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requires her to wear a headscarf, prohibiting her from doing so
infringes on her right to freedom of religion and conscience.
D. The Interface of the Right to Freedom of Religion and
Conscience and the Right to Equality
The interface of the right to freedom of religion and
conscience and the right to equality involves two areas of debate:
the first may be regarded as the group equality issue; the second
as the gender equality issue. Here, the first issue revolves around
.the rights that Muslims in general, and Muslim women in
particular, enjoy with respect to their ability to exercise their
beliefs and customs in comparison to other social and religious
groups. The second issue focuses primarily on the need to ensure
that women are not discriminated against, based on a supposed
need to maintain their freedom of religion and conscience.
The group equality issue: the United Nations Human Rights
Commission claims, with regard to limitations placed on the
exercise of the freedom of religion and conscience, based on section
18(3) of the ICCPR,55 that "restrictions may not be imposed for
discriminatory purposes, or applied in a discriminatory manner."'
Moreover, section 1 of the United Nations Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief (United Nations Declaration) states
the following regarding the freedom of religion and conscience:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or
whatever belief of his [or her] choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his [or her] religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.57
Arguably, the objective of the French "headscarves ban" is
only to prohibit the wearing of headscarves, while other religious
symbols will still be allowed. The basis for this claim is the fact
that the legislation solely applies to ostentatious symbols: whereas
a cross can be covered with a shirt or a blouse, and a skullcap
covered by a hat or a cap, a headscarf is by nature visible, and

55. See ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 18(3) ("Freedom to manifest one's
religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.").
56. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 33 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
57. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR 36th
Sess., 73d plen. mtg., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc AIRES/36/51 (1981)
[hereinafter United Nations Declaration].
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thus by nature ostentatious.' Accordingly, based on the effectstest adopted in the United Nations Declaration, 9 one could assert
that the new legislation discriminates against Muslim women
based on religious affiliation' even if the legislators' intent may
have been different, because the only group detrimentally affected
by the legislation is the Muslim women group. 61 In contrast,
Professor Brian Barry argues, that if an institution can
substantiate a legitimate interest in requiring people to wear a cap
rather than a turban, for example, then doing so does not
constitute discrimination, even if the decision affects one group
more than it affects other groups.6
Another problematic aspect of the ban involves the validity of
basing a prohibition on the motive for wearing an ostentatious
symbol. For example, would the wearing of the Star of David be
banned if considered to be a religious symbol, but allowed if
considered to be a national symbol (of the State of Israel)? In the
United States, claims of discrimination have been raised by
students who were prohibited from wearing symbols that carry a
religious meaning, while other students were allowed to wear
symbols that possess non-religious connotations. In 1995,
President Bill Clinton asked then Secretary of Education Richard
Riley "to provide every public school district in America with a
statement of principles addressing the extent to which religious
expression and activity are permitted in [American] public
schools.' After the Supreme Court's decision in Boerne v.

58. See Thomas Giegerich, Freedom of Religion as a Source of Claims to
Equality and Problems for Equality, 34 ISR. L. REV. 211, 235-36 (2000)

(arguing that provisions which prohibit certain activities should not be
religiously motivated).
59. See United Nations Declaration, supra note 57, at art. 2(2) (adopting

"[flor purposes of the [United Nations Declaration]" a definition for the
expression "'intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief"
mean[ing] any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or

impairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis" (emphasis added)).
60. Poulter, supra note 18, at 61. A more direct discriminatory effect may
be observed in Singapore, where wearing veils in public schools is prohibited,
Veiled Threats, THE
while wearing Turbans (by Sikhs) is allowed.
ECONOMIST, Feb 9, 2002, § Asia.
61. See Richard Abel, Fighting Words, 1 MARGINS 199, 205 (2001) (noting
how "western nations steadfastly refuse to accord equality to Islam," as in

France where Muslim girls are not permitted to wear headscarves, but Jewish
boys are allowed to wear yarmulkes).
62. Brian Barry, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM 319-20 (2002).
63. Letter from Richard Riley, Sec'y of Educ., to American Educators (May
1998), availableat: http//www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html.
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64 Secretary Riley updated
Flores,
the letter to reflect the decision,
making the following determination regarding student attire:

Students generally have no Federal right to be exempted from
religiously-neutral and generally applicable school dress rules based
on their religious beliefs or practices; however, schools may not
single out religious attire in general, or attire of a particular
religion, for prohibition or regulation. Students may display
religious messages on items of clothing to the same extent that they
are permitted to display other comparable messages. 65
Based on this logic, one could claim that the new legislative
scheme in France discriminates against religious groups because
wearing ostentatious symbols that do not carry religious meaning
are still allowed. Thus, a valid claim can be made as to the
discriminatory effect the legislation has on both Muslim women
specifically, and religious groups generally.
The gender equality issue: some claim, that non-Western
societies that adopt Shari'a law as their state law are
predominantly patriarchal, whereas secular societies tend to be
more gender-equal.' According to these scholars, wearing a
headscarf would be the first step toward oppression of women by
symbolizing their inferiority. The claim is that a woman does not
make a real choice to wear a veil, but rather is forced to wear it by
her social environment, which includes her immediate family,
friends, and socio-religious organizations."
Article Five of the United Nations Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEADAW") requires signatories to the convention (France
included) to take proactive measures to eliminate prejudice and
discriminatory practices against women.' While the Convention
64. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 unconstitutional, exceeding the authority granted Congress).
65. Memorandum from Richard Riley, Sec'y of Educ., on Principles
Regarding Religious Expression in Public Schools, Revised (May 1998),
availableat http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html.
66. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 9, 11-12 (Joshua Cohen, Matthew
Howard & Martha Nussbaum eds., 1999) [hereinafter MULTICULTURALISM].
67. See Katha Pollitt, Whose Culture, in MULTICULTURALISM 27, at 29-30

(stating that without the ban a Muslim girl would be forced to wear a scarf).
But see Incense, silk and jihad, THE ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, at 37 (wearing

a veil by young Muslim women is described as a "fad" in South-East Asia).
68. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, Annex, U.N. DOC. A/Res/341180 (Dec. 18,
1979) [hereinafter CEADAW] (the treaty came into effect on Sep. 3, 1981).
Article 5 reads:
Parties shall take all appropriate measures ... [t]o modify the social
and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
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illustrates the need for states to protect women in their societies,
the question arises as to states' moral duty towards other societies.
Some scholars maintain that Western societies should fight for
women's rights in other societies with the same conviction they
apply to fights within their own societies.69 Others contend that a
deep tension exists between feminism and multiculturalism. °
While multiculturalism enhances differences between cultures,
insomuch as these include different roles played by the sexes,
predominantly meaning in effect male domination,7 feminism
devotes efforts to restrain these differences in order to promote
gender equality."
On the other hand, the multicultural demand for recognition
of the special needs and interests of minority groups resembles the
similar claim made by feminists, since both desire to promote their
own interpretation of equality." Further, some women who pride
themselves on their social and cultural heritage aspire to continue
living according to that heritage, even if it greatly contradicts the
Western perception of gender equality. 4 The supposed "protection" of women in the Western world is considered by some
writers to be cultural imperialism.' Thus, it is claimed by some
writers that Professor Susan Okin, one of the leading scholars in
feminist legal writing, is, in effect, encouraging discrimination
against various groups based on religion, race, ethnicity, or
language by her support of a headscarves ban as a means to
achieve gender equality."
Others might wonder why the assumption that wearing a
headscarf carries a suppressing and humiliating effect is not
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.
Id. at art. 5(a).
69. See Joseph Raz, How Perfect Should One Be?, in MULTICULTURALISM,
supra note 66, at 95-97 (explaining that the an examination as to the
protection granted by a certain culture to human rights ought to be made prior
to making a decision as to the need for its protection).
70. See Bonnie Honig, My Culture Made Me Do It, in MULTICULTURALISM,
supra note 66, at 35.
71. Okin, supra note 66, at 13. But see Honig, supra note 70, at 36 (arguing
that religions do not attempt to control female sexuality).
72. Robert Post, Between Norms and Choices, in MULTICULTURALISM,
supra note 66, at 65.
73. Will Kimlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra
note 66, at 31, 33.
74. Catherine Hardee, BalancingActs: The Rights of Women and Cultural
Minorities in Kenyan MartialLaw, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 712, 720 (2004).
75. Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism,
Minority Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L.
REV. 483,487 (2002).
76. See Abdullai An-Na'im, Promises We Should all Keep, in
MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 66, at 59-60; Bhikhu Parekh, A Varied Moral
World, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 66, at 69, 70.
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contested, while wearing a mini-skirt is considered to be a
fashionable, feminist, and liberating act. As one scholar maintains, women are often covered in Western societies by "invisible,
transparent veils" which take the form of financial or social
limitations, and which have a harsher effect on their liberty and
happiness than the freely worn veil."
As for gender-equal oriented education, article 10 of the
CEADAW requires signatory countries to take "all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to
ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education." 8
The claim is made that because education is the most important
factor determining women's uninterrupted path to an equal stance
in society, minority groups should not be allowed to limit women's
right to a proper education."9
But another claim is that prohibiting minority groups from
providing women with allegedly discriminatory education is in
effect even more discriminatory if it would lead to these women
receiving no education at all, because, as reality proves, the
supposed alternative for these women - attending private schools
- is too expensive to be a feasible option for most of them.'
In summary, the headscarf ban allegedly hurts Muslims'
freedom of religion in general, and in particular the freedom of
religion of Muslim women insomuch as it carries a discriminatory
effect unique to them. As for gender equality, those who perceive
the veil to be a symbol of oppression support its prohibition as a
means to promote gender equality. Others fear the opposite
result, i.e., that if such a prohibition prevails, Muslim women will
be denied access to proper education.
E.

The Right to Culture in InternationalLaw

Article 27 of the ICCPR defines the protection granted to the
right to culture in International Law: "In those states in which
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right in community with
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own

77. Aziza Al- Hibri, Western PatriarchalFeminism, in OKIN, supra note 66,
at 4541, 4546.
78. CEADAW, supra note 68, at art. 5.
79. See generally id. (providing that parties to the CEADAW shall take
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in order to
ensure equal rights in education).
80. Cf Les 6tablissements d'enseignement prives, http://www.education.
gouv.fr/cid251/les-etablissements-d-enseignement-prives.html
(last visited
Feb. 14, 2007) (stating that in France, seventeen percent of all students attend
a private school; only thirteen percent of grade school students attend a
private school; and most private schools have a religious affiliation).
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language.""' While the line that separates the personal and group
right to culture may not be clearly demarcated, one can define the
group right to culture as one which is not granted on a general,
universal basis but is rather granted to a particular group.
Some scholars resent the entire notion of group rights, while
others claim these rights exist to protect minorities that may
otherwise be exposed to possible extinction.' In the latter's view,
group rights serve as a means to equalize the minority and
majority groups' stance in society.8'
In Mandla v. Dowell Lee, The British House of Lords ruled
that two preconditions need to be met in order for a group to be
recognized as an ethnic group for purposes of receiving the
protection under UK law: first, there must be a common history
that differentiates the group from other groups; and second, social
heritage, including social and religious customs, must be
identified. Alongside these two preconditions, a number of aiding
factors exist for determining whether a group is an ethnic group.8
According to the House of Lords criteria, French Muslims would
probably constitute an ethnic group that enjoys the right to
culture.
Professor Will Kymlicka argues that the protection to the
right to culture has three main components: the first and most
basic is the right to maintain an uninterrupted lifestyle within the
general society; the second adds the right to have this unique
lifestyle recognized by the general society; the third includes the
right to receive state support (financial and other) to keep the
culture alive.' Opponents of the headscarves ban claim that the
legislation undermines the first component of protection identified.
Professor
Kymlicka
distinguishes
between
internal
restrictions that limit individuals' rights within a social group, and
external restrictions, which enable the group to protect itself from
outside pressure. He maintains, that internal restrictions need to
be prohibited in order to protect the various group members who
81. ICCPR, supra note 40, art. 27.
82. Patrick Thornberry, INTERNATIONAL

LAW

AND THE

RIGHTS

OF

MINORITIES 252 (1991).

83. Will Kimlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra
note 73, at 31-34.
84. Id. at 20.
85. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 A.C. 548, 562 (Eng.). The House of
Lords held that nonessential, but relevant factors include:
[Elither a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number
of common ancestors; a common language, not necessarily peculiar to
the group; a common literature peculiar to the group; a common religion

different from that of the neighbouring [sic] groups or from the general
community surrounding it; being a minority or being an oppressed or a
dominant group within a larger community.

Id.
86. Kymlicka, supra note 73, at 31-34.
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are badly affected by them (the minority within the minority),
whereas external restrictions are legitimate and should be
allowed." Analyzing the headscarves ban according to this factor
results in the conclusion, that requiring women to wear a veil, like
the Taliban did in Afghanistan, is in effect an internal restriction,
while allowing a Muslim woman in France to wear a veil is an
external restriction.
This distinction, however, is frequently
questioned based on the claim that in many instances the same
rights serve as a justification for both external and internal
restrictions.
The European Court of Human Rights established that a
democratic society's foundation lies in its tolerance for other
cultural behaviors, including non-liberal ones.'
Despicable as
another culture may seem, tolerance requires acceptance of its
existence and the diversity within society. This multicultural
approach gives way to a supposedly logical problem: tolerance is
required with regard to intolerant societies, which often are
intolerant both externally and internally.0 Thus, protection of
group rights often means infringing individual rights, and the
government's need to strike a balance between respecting other
cultures and granting universal protection for basic human
rights. 9
It appears from the discussion above, that according to
international conventions, Muslims should be defined as a
distinctive ethnic group eligible to exercise its group right to
culture, though some fear that a limitless exercise thereof severely
infringes upon individual rights of persons belonging to this group
and thus should be limited.
F.

The Headscarfas a Pan-Islamic CulturalSymbol

Defining the veil as an Islamic symbol is criticized by those
who claim that it serves first and foremost as a cultural object.92
For example, the Selfs, a reformist movement that existed in the
last quarter of the 19th Century, argued that Islam is Orthopraxis
(where behavior and lifestyle outweigh faith) rather than
Orthodoxy. Others see the veil as a political statement expressed
by women who wear it, designed to create a clear definition of a
minority group and to prevent assimilation, a process much feared
by the elderly. 3 Considering the veil to be a cultural symbol for a
87. Id. at 32.
88. Giegerich, supra note 58, at 235-36.
89. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 EUR. CT. H.R. 397, 411 (1994).
90.
91.
92.
93.
Work,

Raz, supra note 69, at 95-96.
Id. at 98.
Poulter, supra note 18, at 45.
Judy Scales-Trent, African Women in France:Immigration, Family and
24 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 705, 715 (1999). But cf Cohen et al.,
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Muslim woman means that society should refrain from restricting
the wearing thereof since such restriction would infringe the
woman's right to culture. However, if Professor Barry's approach,
which does not recognize the existence of cultural rights, gains
strength, the prohibition would then be considered, at most, an
infringement on the right to religion (assuming it retains the
status of a religious object alongside a cultural one).
According to Professor Okin's approach, which limits the
protection granted to the right to culture to those instances in
which such protection does not infringe individual rights within
the minority group, wearing a veil, a symbol of oppression, need
not be protected.
G. The Interface of the Right to Culture and the Right to
Education
The right to educate a child according to the parents' beliefs is
well respected by international conventions. Article 13 of the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR")"4 established the right to education, which ought to be
implemented without discrimination based on religion, gender, or
race.95 Article 2 of the first protocol of the ECHR calls upon the
member states to respect the right of parents to educate their
children according to their beliefs.' A similar declaration appears
in Article 5 of the CEADAW.97
Introduction:

Feminism, Multiculturalism, and Human Equality, in
supra note 66, at 3 (discussing the women movement

MULTICULTURALISM,

generally). Contra Honig, supra note 70, at 37 (claiming that veiling actually
facilitates assimilation by allowing women to "emerge socially into a sexually
integrated urbpn world") (internal quotation marks omitted); Parekh, supra
note 76, at 73 (claiming that wearing a hijab is a complex act intended both to

"remain within the tradition and to challenge it").
94. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on Jan. 3, 1976).

95. Id. art. 13.
96. Article 2 of the ECHR reads:
The right to organize the life within the family in accordance with their
religion or belief, and bearing in mind the moral education in which they
believe the child should be brought up. After all, parents are generally

understood to act in the interests of their children, and to take on the
primary responsibility of caring for them.
ECHR, supra note 41, art. 2. Cf Shauna Van Praagh, The Education of
Religious Children:Families, Communities and Constitutions, 47 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1343, 1356 (1999) ("Th[e] liberal citizenship model allows for giving
parents, and indirectly communities, some degree of control over the education

of their children. After all, parents are generally understood to act in the
interests of their children, and to take on the primary responsibility of caring
for them.").
97. Article 5 of the CEADAW reads:

Parties shall take all appropriate measures ... [t]o ensure that family
education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social
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Professor Okin, however, contends that providing proper
education requires that the child become familiar not only with the
culture of his or her parents, but also with general, common
values.' This position stems from the assertion that the interests
of parents and children may greatly differ with regard to
education:' whereas children may wish to assimilate in the
general society, their parents may prefer to maintain the
traditional structures and norms. According to Professor Okin,
the state must step in and exercise responsibility with regard to
education, based on its legitimate interest in ensuring that the
next generation receives proper education. 00
On the one hand, the right to education according to the
parents' beliefs and norms requires the state to allow minority
Yet,
groups to preserve their cultural and religious norms.
especially in countries where the primary responsibility for
education lies with the state (such as France), the state may wish
to act in order to ensure that a common/general education is
provided to students at the expense of full parental autonomy.
IV.

COMMON MODELS OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND
RELIGION

A. Introduction
The following section provides an analysis of the legal
framework regarding the interplay between state and religion in
four countries: Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom
("UK") and Germany. Turkey offers a model rather similar to the
French model following the recent headscarf legislation. The
United States, on the other hand, a nation that is perhaps home to
the highest percentage of religious faithful in the Western world,
strictly maintains a separation between state and religion in a
model quite different than the French model, as will be illustrated
below. The United Kingdom serves as a model for tolerance
towards religions other than the official state religion of
Christianity. Finally, Germany, a country where the right to
freedom of religion and conscience is granted constitutional
protection, has borne witness to a process of wearing down this
protection, for reasons similar to some of those expressed in
function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and

women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being
understood that the interest of the children is the primordial
consideration in all cases.
CEADAW, supra note 68, art. 5(b).
98. Susan Moller Okin, Reply, in MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 66, at
129-30.
99. Barry, supra note 62, at 202.
100. Id. at 303.
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France. Analyzing the different models will provide the reader
with a conceptual framework for analyzing the rationales behind
the new legislation in France.
B. The Secular State Model: Turkey
Following World War I, Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk
abolished the Caliph regime, which ruled over the Ottoman
Empire, and enacted a thorough constitutional change in the state
regime, making it explicitly secular.' 01 Article 2 of the Turkish
Constitution defined Turkey as a secular state: "The Turkish State
is republican, nationalist, statist, secular and reformist. "1" Article
24 of the Turkish Constitution established the right to freedom of
religion and conscience, which is restricted insofar as it infringes
other people's rights. 3 The Article explicitly states that no person
shall be forced to participate in religious ceremonies.1°
Turkish legislation prohibits the wearing of religious symbols
in public institutions, including schools and universities. 5 The
national council in charge of coordinating human rights affairs in
Turkey decided several years ago that the measure is compatible
with the Turkish Constitution and with human rights law, stating
that:
The ban on wearing headscarves in government offices and
universities is not against the basic human rights and freedoms
because the headscarves are symbols of "political ideology".... The
regulations pertaining to headscarves, if evaluated according to the
constitution, are part of the constitutional principle of secularism
which warrants the objectivity of the state in religious issues. In

101. Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and
Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 67 (2002).
102. CONSTITUrION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, art. 2, available at

httpJ/www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm.
103. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, art. 24. Article 24 reads:

Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and
conviction. Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be
conducted freely, provided that they do not violate the provisions of
Article 14. No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in
religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and
convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and

convictions. Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be
conducted under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious
culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of
Other religious education and
primary and secondary schools.

instruction shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and in the
case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives ....

Id.
104. Oktem, supra note 8, at 386.
105. Ann Mayer, A "Benign"Apartheid: How Gender Apartheid Has Been
Rationalized, 5 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 314 (2000).
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this context, a ban on headscarves, which are used as a symbol of
political ideology, does not go against the Constitution.'0
In Bulut v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights accepted
the Turkish Government's claim that the prohibition on wearing
headscarves in universities is necessary to maintain the principle
of secularity, one of the prime constitutional principles in
Turkey."7 The prohibition therefore helps maintain public order,
one of the legitimate causes for limitations posed on the right to
freedom of religion, according to article 9 of the ECHR. In a later
case, regarding a claim made by a medical student who was
prohibited from attending classes while wearing a veil, the court,
in line with the Bulut ruling, stated that the prohibition met "a
pressing social need by pursuing the legitimate aims of protecting
the rights
and freedoms of others and maintaining public order" in
08
Turkey.
One may question whether these rulings contradict a previous
ruling of the ECHR in Manoussakis v. Greece, where the court held
that "[tihe right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the
convention excludes any discretion on the part of the state to
determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express
such beliefs are legitimate.""°
Additionally, some question the
historical basis for the prohibition on wearing headscarves,
mentioning that Ataturk's wife wore a veil, and that he did not
view it negatively: "The religious covering of women will not cause
difficulty... this simple style [of head-covering] is not in conflict
with the morals and manners of the society."110
It may be that the Turks' increased fear of wearing
headscarves in public places stems not from a legal basis, but
rather from a cultural one - the possible establishment of an
Islamic republic that would make headscarves mandatory."'
Statistics show that ninety-seven percent of the Turkish
population is Muslim, and forty-six percent thereof pray five times
a day as Islam commands a Muslim to do." 2
Another commonly expressed claim is that wearing a

106. Oktem, supra note 8, n.146.
107. App. No. 18783/91, 74 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993); see
also Christopher D. Belelieu, Note, The Headscarfas a Symbolic Enemy of the
European Court of Human Rights' Democratic Jurisprudence: Viewing Islam
Through a European Legal Prism in Light of the Sahin Judgment, 12 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 573, (2006) (discussing the Bulut ruling in further depth).
108. Sahin v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2005).
109. Manoussakis v. Greece, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 387, 389 (1996).
110. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 26 (quoting ATATURKISM,
VOLUME 1 126 (Istanbul, Office of the Chief of General Staff, 1982)).
111. See id. at 37-38 (discussing the fears expressed by several scholars
concerning the establishment of a theocracy).
112. Edward McBride, Fundamental Separation, THE ECONOMIST, June 10,
2000, at 11.
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headscarf in public places in Turkey is a symptom of a power
struggle: as long as women who wore headscarves remained
outcasts, the headscarf did not pose a threat to central power
structures; the shift occurred when these women expressed a wish
113
to study in universities - one of the symbols of secular Turkey.
In summary, Turkey appears to legally justify the prohibition
on wearing headscarves as a means of maintaining its secular
character. However, it seems that the reasons for the ban go
deeper and relate to social-cultural questions similar, at least in
part, to those presented in France discussed below.
C. The Separationof Church and State Model: the United States
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
establishes the principle of separation of church and state:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. . ." In Everson
v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,"5 the Supreme Court
quoted Thomas Jefferson, describing a "wall of separation"
between religion and state in America prohibiting the federal
government from intervening in religious affairs even if these
concern equal funding to various religious movements.1 1 6 In
Wallace v. Jaffree,"7 Justice Rehnquist argued, in a dissenting
opinion, that the First Amendment is designed to prevent the
government from promoting a particular religion or sect, or
declaring an official religion, rather than to prevent general state
support for all religions. 118
Some scholars believe the Supreme Court erred, at least in
the years following Everson, in clarifying the requirements
concerning the relationship between state and religion as a result
of the "wall of separation."" 9 Justice Stewart argued, for instance,
that the government is obliged to create an atmosphere of
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Editorial, The DreadedHeadscarf,THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2002, at 50.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 15-16.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).

118. Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Establishment
Clause was not created to prohibit nondiscriminatory aid to religion, but
rather aimed to prevent the establishment of a national religion); see also Paul
Horwitz, The Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal
Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond, 54 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 18-19
(1996) (discussing Rehnquist's Wallace dissent).
119. Steven Brown & Cynthia Bowling, Public Schools and Religious
Expression: The Diversity of School Districts' Policies Regarding Religious
Expression, 45 J. CHURCH & ST. 259, 261-62 (2003); see also Sophie C. van
Bijsterveld, Church and State in Western Europe and the United States:
Principles and Perspectives, 2000 BYU L. REV. 989, 989 (2000) (comparing

cooperative relations between church and state in Western Europe to the "wall
of separation" in the United States).
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acceptance between all religious streams, a conclusion that does
not on its face follow from Everson."'
In the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court began a steady move
towards viewing religion as an obstacle standing in the liberal
state's way. 1 ' In Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,"' Justice Scalia made the following
statement with regard to the constitutionality of state legislation
on religious actions: "Our conclusion that generally applicable,
religion neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular
religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest is the only approach compatible with these
precedents.""' After Smith, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act." 4 Section 3 required states to create
conditions, which would facilitate the implementation of the right
to religion unless a compelling state interest required the
contrary."' Faced with a constitutionality test, however, the
legislation was struck down by the Supreme Court based on the
2
premise that it contradicted the First Amendment."
However, the Supreme Court had earlier explicitly
established that a distinction must be made between government
action and personal action with regard to religious affairs whereas the state is not allowed to support or promote a certain
religion, individuals enjoy freedom of expression, as well as
freedom of religion:

120. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 415 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the guarantee of religious liberty requires a
government to "create an atmosphere of hospitality and accommodation to
individual belief of disbelief").
121. Horwitz, supra note 118, at 36 (presenting the argument that religion
presents a threat to the social order).
122. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
123. Id. at 886.
124. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 2(b),
107 Stat. 1488, 1488-89 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, 2000bb-1 to
2000bb-4 (2000)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
125. Satvinder Juss, The Constitution and Sikhs in Britain, 1995 BYU L.
REV. 481, 486-87 (1995). The section reads:
(a) Government shall not burden a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a person's exercise

of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person:
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

interest.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
126. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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There is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the establishment clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the free speech and free exercise clauses
protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough
and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or
that it merely permits on a nonsupport student speech
1 27
discriminatory basis.
Based on this premise, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
struck down a California public school decision prohibiting Sikh
students from wearing to school a Kirpan (a customary sword),
which is an inseparable part of their religious custom. 2 ' On the
contrary, however, a recent decision regarding a Muslim woman
who was refused a driver's license because she would not take off
her veil when her picture was taken, affirmed the authority's
decision based on the need to protect the State against foreign and
domestic terrorism."9
In summary, there is a clear difference between the United
States legal framework and the Turkish and French legal
frameworks within which the interplay between state and religion
takes place. While the latter are secular states, which cast away
all religious expression from the public sphere, in the United
States, the fear - and the cure - relate to state action alone, and
limitations on private actions are seldom upheld unless other
interests (such as security) arise.
D. The Official Religion State Model: The United Kingdom and
Germany
1.

The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, where Christianity is the official
religion (and the Anglican Church is the state's official church),
As a result, until its
does not have a written constitution.1 30
Parliament enacted the Human Rights Act ("HRA") in 1998,2
incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights' into
UK law, human rights were not granted an overriding status over
127. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990).
128. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
129. Freeman v. State, No. 02-CA-2828, 2003 WL 21338619 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
June 6, 2003).
130. Conventional wisdom holds that the reason for the United Kingdom's
constitutional void is the lack of a constitutional moment and the relative
stability of the regime.
131. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
132. Since there are no "self-executing" treaties under United Kingdom law,
the fact that the United Kingdom was a signatory to the European Convention
on Human Rights did not directly affect the implementation of International
Human Rights Law there.
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regular laws. Section 13 of the HRA, however, establishes the
right to freedom of religion and conscience, and grants the right a
special status, higher than other rights in the ECHR."'
Until the enactment of the HRA, human rights in the United
Kingdom were protected at their most basic level by the Race
Relations Act ("RRA").'
In its original form, the RRA prohibited
discrimination based on race in certain public places, and
established the Race Relations Board and the Community
Relations Committee ("CRC.'
Several years later, the act was
amended, and a Commission for Racial Equality ("CRE") replaced
the CRC."6
However, while discrimination on the basis of
nationality was added to the RRA,"' no equivalent prohibition
existed with regard to religion.'38
From the 1983 House of Lords' decision in Mandla, which was
given before the enactment of the HRA, one could conclude that
discrimination against a student based on religious affiliation was
The case involved a private school's
not necessarily illegal."9
decision not to accept a Sikh student who refused to remove his
Turban in school. The House of Lords did grant the petition, but
used an "ethnic origin" framework by defining the Sikhs as an
ethnic group " in order to bring the student under the protection of
the RRA. Decisions made by other schools, which resulted in
discrimination against Sikhs, were not overruled."'
Additionally, in Nyazi v. Rymans Ltd., a claim brought by
Muslims who demanded to be treated as an ethnic group under the
RRA was denied based on the assertion that Muslims are not an
ethnic group but a religious one: Muslims include people of many
nations and colours, who speak many languages, and whose only
common denominator is religion, and religious culture.'
However, in contrast to judicial review of private school decisions,
no case has arisen where public schools tried to prohibit students

133. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 13 (Eng.). Section 13 reads: "If a
court's determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the
exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the
Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have
particular regard to the importance of that right."
134. Race Relations Act, 1968, c. 71 (Eng.).
135. Id.
136. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 43 (Eng.).
137. Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § 1 (Eng.).
138. See London Borough of Ealing v. Race Relations Board, [1972] 2 A.C.
342.
139. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 A.C. 548, 568 (Eng.) (Lord Templeman)
("The [Race Relations] Act does not outlaw discrimination against a group of
persons defined by reference to religion.").
140. Id. at 562 (Eng.); see also supra note 92.
141. Juss, supra note 125, at 530.
142. See Poulter, supra note 18.
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from wearing religious symbols, and thus, the courts have not
addressed this issue.
Despite the lack of legal recognition for the right not to be
discriminated against based on religious affiliation, British society
has expressed, and still does, great tolerance towards minority
groups, religious groups notwithstanding. One could, therefore,
argue that the lack of formal legal recognition for religious rights
in Britain is actually a testament of tolerance. Thus, the legal
approach to religious expression in the public sphere seems to
indicate that the British model grants a relatively high level of
protection to religious practices, despite the fact that the United
Kingdom is officially a Christian state.
2.

Germany

Section 4 of the German Basic Law (the federal constitution)
protects the freedom of religion and conscience, and defines it as a
non-derogatory right: (1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and
freedom of creed religious or ideological, shall be inviolable; (2)
The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed .... "
Infringing upon this right is allowed only when another
constitutional principle justifies such infringement.1"
The landmark case pertaining to the wearing of headscarves
in Germany involved a Muslim teacher named Fereshta Ludin,
who was fired from a public school for refusing to take off her veil
in class.'" In September 2003, the German Federal Constitutional
Court, in a majority opinion, overturned previous rulings by lower
courts and held that Ms. Ludin could not be prevented from
wearing headscarves under current German law."
The court, however, left the door open for state legislation to
the contrary, stating that such legislation would not necessarily be
unconstitutional.147 The court noted that the state's religious
143. Grundgesetz

ftr die Bundersrepublik

Deutschland,

art.

4(1)-(2),

translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: GERMANY

(Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2003).
144. See Giegerich, supra note 58, at 221 ("[Any limitation imposed by
legislation on the freedom of religion must be narrowly tailored to further a
textually demonstrable constitutional value.").
145. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court]
Sep. 24, 2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 (F.R.G.).
146. Id. at
74. The case reached the constitutional court after several
earlier procedures, starting from an appeal submitted by the teacher to the
Administrative Court of Stuttgart. Id. at 5. There was a second appeal to
the Administrative Court of Baden-Wiirttemberg. Id. at 1 8. Then a third
appeal to the Federal Administrative Court. Id. at 12. The state's position
was upheld in all of these procedures, based on the premise that the school's
decision was reasonable, and that a teacher, being a state representative,
cannot express affiliation to any religious group since that would infringe the
students' freedom from religion. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 65.
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neutrality should not be viewed as a strict separation between
church and state."" Rather, the court ruled that religion's
neutrality should be seen as a system of balancing acts between
four competing interests: (1) the teacher's freedom of religion; (2)
the duty of neutrality of a teacher in a public school; (3) the right
of parents to influence their children's education; and (4) the right
of children not to be exposed to unwanted religious influences.
In two of Germany's nineteen Lander (States), BadenWurttemberg and Lower Saxony, laws were enacted following the
Ludin ruling, prohibiting the wearing of headscarves.''
The
Baden-Wurttemberg Supreme Constitutional Court ruled in a
subsequent decision that the new act also encompasses nuns who
teach in schools because no exception can be made regarding
religious attire in schools."' According to the opinion, the ruling
stems from Germany's commitment to the prohibition of
discrimination based on religious affiliation."'
It appears, therefore, that Germany, which is not a secular
state, but rather has an official religion (as the United Kingdom
does), grants less protection to the freedom of religion than the
protection granted in the United States. The reasons for this may
derive from a lack of tradition of protecting religious minorities, or
from a fear, similar to the one expressed in Turkey, of a negative
cultural effect on society, rather than merely a religious one."'
E. A Final Comparison:the De-FactoProtectionof the Practiceof
Wearing Headscarves
We have examined the legal model in Turkey and France,
which allows for prohibition on Muslim women's right to wear a
headscarf in public schools. In contrast, the American model,
which many mistakenly identify with the French model, focuses on
state rather than private action, and protects individual rights in
148. See id. at $ 43 ("Die dem Staat gebotene religibs-weltanschauliche
Neutralitat ist indes nicht als eine distanzierende im Sinne einer strikten
Trennung von Staat und Kirche.").
149. Second German State Bans Headscarves, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29,
2004, httpJ/www.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=O&article=4400&d=29&m=
48&y= 2004.
150. Carolyn Evans, The "Islamic Scarf" in the European Court of Human
Rights, 7 MELB. J. INT'L L. 52, 54 (2006).
151. See Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves From
French Public Schools and ControversiesSurrounding the Hijab in the Western
World, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251, 274-75 (2006) (quoting the court's
decision that "the law had to apply equally to all religious symbols, including
nuns' habits, and could not discriminately target Muslim religious dress"); see
also Kate Connolly, Teaching Nuns Hit by Muslim Headscarf Ban, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Oct. 11, 2004, at 12 (quoting the court's decision that "it
would be unjust if a law passed.., prohibiting Muslim women teachers from
wearing headscarves did not also apply to Christian symbols").
152. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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The United Kingdom and Germany, supposedly
this regard.
representing a similar model, where, on the one hand, the state
has an official religion, and on the other hand, tolerance is
expressed towards other religious streams, greatly differ in reality
based on social practices and perspectives with regard to
multiculturalism. We shall now examine the rationales leading to
the adoption of the headscarves ban in France, where a legal
perception regarding the proper place of religion in society lies
alongside a societal overview of the proper treatment of
multiculturalism.
V.

FRENCH SOCIETY AND THE RATIONALES BEHIND THE

HEADSCARVES BAN
For some people, [the headscarf]is a symbol of religious devotion, for
some of identity, for some of rebellion, for some of male domination,
for some of immigration, multiculturalismand unFrenchness.lu5

A. Secularity and Neutrality in French Public Education
Most students in France study in public schools, where the
curriculum is set by the state, according to the Jacobin notion...
that only a centralized state can protect the public welfare and
maintain equal rights for all.'55 As was previously described,
France is a self-declared secular state, 156 and the way schools are
run is directly influenced by that concept.
Over the years, two contradicting interpretations of the
The first is that
principle of secularity have developed.17
secularity requires not only that the state refrain from interfering
in the public sphere, but also would require religion to be a total

153. Veil of Woes, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2003, § Leader.
154. In the context of the French revoultion, a Jacobin originally meant a
member of the Jacobin Club, which existed between the years 1789-1794.
DAVID P. JORDAN, THE KING'S TRIAL: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION VS. Louis XVI
19-20, 202 (1979). However, the term Jacobins has been popularly applied to
all promulgators of extreme revolutionary opinions. Poulter, supra note 18, at
54-55. In contemporary France this term refers to the concept of a centralized
republic, with power concentrated in the national government at the expense
of local or regional governments. See id. ("In French education [Jacobin]has
come to mean.., the study of nationally prescribed curricula, within a
standarized structure... (citation omitted)).
155. Poulter, supra note 18, at 54 (stating that under Jacobin beliefs,
decisions ought to be made by a central authority subject to little to no local
influence).
156. See supra, Part I.A.
157. See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the
European Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J. 331,
344 (2003) (discussing the potential conflict between principles of equality and
principles of proportionality in state regulation in the European Union).
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outcast.'
The second is that secularity obliges the authorities to
refrain from promoting one religion over the others, but would not
influence the way individuals behave in the public sphere, since
the fact that an individual expresses his or her religion in public
does not hurt the state's self-declared secularity."9 Therefore, the
question in France is not whether a Muslim student should be
allowed to wear a veil based on her right to freedom of religion, but
rather whether wearing a veil undermines the state's secular
status.' 60
Examining the legal developments over the last several years,
one can note that while the Conseil d'Etat has balanced the right
to freedom of religion and the secularity principle based on the
second interpretation, the new legislation reflects the first
interpretation, which grants secularity a more comprehensive
meaning."' The new trend may derive from an ever-growing fear
in France that religious
expression will undermine the neutral
162
status of schools.
In the past, the number of students carrying ostentatious
religious (either Muslim or other) symbols in schools was
insignificant. However, as a result of the overall percentage of
Muslim's in the general population, and with the increase in
immigration, the number of students wishing to express their
religion by wearing ostentatious symbols has risen." The fear is,
therefore, that a critical mass of openly expressive religious
students in schools may undermine the balance and hurt the
neutrality of public schools.
B. Assimilation and the "MeltingPot" in Practice
The "melting pot" theory" of the French Republic is best
reflected in France's submitted reservation regarding the
application of section 27 of the ICCPR,n which recognizes a right
to culture. According to this theory, there are no group rights in
France because the state constitution does not grant rights to

158. Id.
159. Id. at 371.
160. See Baines, supra note 10, at 320 (discussing why the ban on women
wearing hijabs violates the principles of the French Constitution).
161. See Walterick, supra note 151, at 254 (discussing how France's
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion have been narrowed by the
government's interest in preserving public order).
162. See id. (noting that it in France it is a priority to keep the "public
sphere ...

free from religious influences").

163. See id. (stating that France's Muslim population is the largest in
Europe and Islam is the second largest religion in France).
164. See Forget Asylum-seekers: it's the People Inside who Count, THE
ECONOMIST, May 10, 2003, § Special Report, at 1 (describing the "republican
values", particularly secularism, that define French society).
165. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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groups, only to individuals." The former president of the republic,
Francois Mitterrand, stated that there are no minorities in France,
and Muslims who define themselves as members of an ethnic
minority group are victims of the process of integration. 167 The
French government has, therefore, always viewed cultural symbols
as divisive and feared that they pose a challenge to the legal and
public order of the French society." The veil, as a cultural and
religious symbol, is a symbol for many French people of the
supposed refusal of those who wear it to fully become French.'69
A possible explanation suggested by scholars for the "melting
pot"'s application in practice is that one needs to differentiate
between countries, such as Canada, where both the majority and
the minority culture share common liberal democratic values
(there, the state does not view assimilation as vital for their
common existence) and countries like France, where a liberal
society is faced with non-liberal minority group's values, and a
"melting pot" application is crucial. However, ironically, French
Muslims, who greatly differ from the majority in culture,
language, race, and customs, find it harder to assimilate for
exactly these reasons."' The fact that the Muslim population in
France amounts to around ten percent of the general population
(and is significantly higher in some cities, such as Marseille), and
that in some public schools the majority of students are Muslim,
does not contribute to successful assimilation, since the bigger a
minority group is, the lesser the chance of a fruitful assimilation.
Multiculturalists, in contrast, argue that the Muslim minority
group is entitled to express its customs and exercise its religion in
both the private and public spheres, even though their practices
may be viewed as discriminatory. According to this view, a state
which forces its residents to assimilate infringes upon the rights of
individuals to preserve their culture, both on a group level and on
a private level, because a person's cultural identity is an
inseparable part of his personality. Moreover, tolerance demands
that liberal cultures tolerate the existence of non-liberal cultures

166. See Beller, supra note 11, at 599 (asserting that the Conseil d'Etat has
found that "group or collective rights are incompatible with the French

Constitution").
167. Poulter, supra note 18, at 50-51. Under this view of the principle of
secularity, "religious and cultural 'distinctions'" should only be recognized in
the privacy of one's home.
168. Editorial, Europe'sMuslims, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, § Leader.
169. See Nora Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative
Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 752 (1999) (discussing the French
reaction to the wearing of headscarves and Muslim immigrants' use of the

French courts to bring about change).
170. See Baines, supra note 10, at 312 ("France's focus on complete
assimilation obviously leaves no room for a multiculturalist philosophy, such
as that of the United States or Canada.").
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alongside their own culture.
In the French context, it is claimed that granting the
opportunity to Muslim students to wear a headscarf would
actually encourage assimilation and integration, because without
such opportunity their parents might not allow them to go to a
public school. The parents would either send them to a private
school, 7' if they could afford one, or would not have them educated
at all. Both of these alternatives are bad for integration.
That French society strongly opposes wearing headscarves in
public schools, while wearing a skullcap or a cross has not raised
similar objections in the past is incongruous. The reason for this
phenomenon, some argue, is that the headscarf not only serves as
a religious symbol, but also as a symbol of a foreign, different, nonliberal and stand-alone culture, which aims to create an
alternative stronghold in society, and prevents Muslim France
from becoming truly French. The headscarf serves therefore as a
challenge to both underlying principles of French society secularity and the "melting pot."
C. Enhancing Gender Equality
The Stasi committee argued that French public schools should
remain a place of freedom and emancipation for women. One of the
common arguments raised by those who favor the prohibition on
headscarves is that the veil serves as a symbol of oppression of
women and religious intolerance in Muslim society, and that in
order to enhance gender equality in schools such a prohibition
serves as a vaccine against these diseases.'72
Raising an interesting claim, the dissent in Ludin argued that
while the cross symbolizes tolerance and therefore having a cross
on the school gate is not an infringement on the right to freedom
from religion, the veil is a symbol of oppression and therefore
should be banned.'
Yet, there is disagreement as to the question
of whether the veil does indeed represent oppression. Even if the
claim is proven correct in theory, one could argue that granting
the gender-equality factor a major role is only meant to gain the
support of the main Western feminist stream. The reason is that
while the arguments regarding the need for maintaining an
assimilated society without public religious symbols may not carry
much weight with these streams, protecting gender equality does.
171. See Van Praagh, supra note 96, at 1390 (noting the willingness of
Muslims in the United States and Canada to send their children to nonsectarian schools where the wearing of a hijab is permitted).
172. See generally Mountis, supra note 53, at 130 (explaining the traditional
role the hijab plays in protecting female chastity, and the centrality of female
chastity to family honor under Islamic law).
173. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE [Federal Constitutional Case]
Sep. 24, 2003, 2 BvR 1436/02 (F.R.G.).
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Nevertheless, the gender equality factor did not play a major role
in the process that led up to the French legislation.
VI. EPILOGUE: THE IMPACT OF SOCIO-LEGAL CONCEPTS ON THE
INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
PROTECTION GRANTED THEM

It seems that despite efforts to set a uniform international
standard for the protection granted to human rights by liberal
democracies, reality proves that a substantial difference exists
between states due to contrasting socio-legal concepts that directly
affect the way these states protect human rights. While in some
states the right to freedom of religion and conscience is interpreted
to allow an individual to practice her religious customs openly in
the public sphere, in other states, the freedom may be limited to
the private sphere only if it collides with the basic foundations of
that given society, be that secularity, assimilation, or both.
The question of whether one should be satisfied with this nonuniform protection depends, first and foremost, on the way one
views multiculturalism in general, and the required tolerance
towards non-liberal societies in particular. Moreover, it is clear
from the above analysis that the question of whether a particular
right was infringed depends on whether one views a certain act as
an exercise of that right, or rather as a symbol of intolerance or
oppression, as some view the headscarves.
French society, which is based on the premise that all groups
must attempt to integrate in the majority culture, leads to
intolerant behavior towards minority cultures. It appears, that
had France been forced to follow a universal standard for
protection of the right to freedom of religion and the right to
culture, it could have been forced to annul the headscarves ban.'
However, this article merely aimed to place the headscarves ban
within a wider framework, so as to analyze why the ban is
considered a necessity in French society, while criticized as
expressing intolerance in other Western democracies.

174. For a general discussion of the Margin of Appreciation doctrine in the
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, see HOWARD YOUROW,
THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996).
Cf Guy E. Carmi, Comparative
Notions of Fairness,4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 304-05 (2005) (noting that
"Ithe European Court of Human Rights tends to see program regulations
designed to further pluralism merely as legitimate restrictions on freedom of

expression" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

